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Key issue: what determines the level of capacity chosen
by profit-maximising electricity generators?
•The Context
•The Model
•Results of a Simulation for Ireland
•Observations and Implications
Structure of Presentation
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The Context (1)
Liberalisation of national electricity industries across
world: New Zealand (1987-), UK, USA.
Atomisation of holdings of generation assets,
decentralisation of investment decisions.
CapGemini’s global survey of utilities (2004): a “worrying
lack of clarity on responsibility for generation adequacy” in
NZ
… although the failure to identify a single “responsible”
party is not surprising.
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The Context (2)
Investment decisions will be driven by the maximisation of
profits of individual generators – rather than fulfillment of
social or political goals.
Does this fact have any long-term implications for system
capacity?
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The Context (3) - Ireland
Like NZ, an island nation with population of approximately
4m.
Small electricity market (approximately 5,100 MW
installed capacity)  relative to “lumpy” generation plant –
eg. Moneypoint (912 MW) and Poolbeg (1020 MW)
stations.
Limited hydro capacity and potential – 220 MW installed.
Ireland’s electricity generation still dominated by
government-owned Electricity Services Board (ESB)
(87% of system generating capacity)
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The Context (4) - Ireland
Prices charged by ESB’s generation division must be approved by the
regulator, the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER).
40% increase in retail electricity prices between 2001 and 2004.
ESB staffing levels reduced, but remaining workers earn more than
double the average industrial wage.
Impression that CER allows pass-through of eg. fuel cost increases 
no incentive for ESB to pursue efficiency.
Irish Competition Authority (2003): introduce competition in generation
by splitting up ESB’s generating assets
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The Model
Perhaps motivated by deregulation in Spanish electricity
industry, three Spanish economists have proposed a
model that explores the motivation of generators:
Castro-Rodriguez, F., Marin, P. and Siotis, G., 2001.
Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets.
London: Centre for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR Discussion
Paper No 2998).
Available from: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2998.asp
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The Model: Two-Stage Game
Stage One – Long-Term Investment Decision:
Industry players choose how much capacity to install, based on their
estimates as to the demand profile across each hour in the coming
period(s).
Capacity is expensive to install – assign fixed cost per each MW.
Stage Two – Electricity Supply:
Generators make supply bids on spot market.  Assume that this
occurs “competitively” - ie. price equals marginal cost of generation,
except where system capacity constraint binds.
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The Model – Demand (1)
DEMAND
SCHEDULE
PRICE
QUANTITY
Supplier will not pay any more than
average consumer “willingness to
pay”.
Some industrial customers can and
will vary their demand depending on
prevailing price.
Electricity supplier intermediates on
behalf of residential and inflexible
industrial customers.
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The Model – Demand (2)
Residential and inflexible industrial
demand fluctuates daily and
seasonally.
Profile of flexible demand is
assumed to remain constant.
 Fluctuations can be represented
by oscillations in kinked part of
schedule.
DEMAND
SCHEDULE
PRICE
DAILY & SEASONAL
DEMAND FLUCTUATION
QUANTIT
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The Model - Supply
SUPPLY
SCHEDULE
PRICE
GENERATING
CAPACITY
QUANTITY
Supply schedule based on marginal
cost of generation.
Costs increase steadily as we move
up the merit order.
Schedule is vertical at level of
installed generating capacity, due to
fixed capacity in short-medium term.
NZISCR, Wellington
15 March 2005
Peter McLay
University College Dublin 12
The Model – Supply and Demand
DEMAND
SCHEDULE
SUPPLY
SCHEDULE
PRICE
QUANTITY
Physical properties of electricity
require that supply and demand be
equal across the network, otherwise
instability will result.
This ties in nicely with market
clearance.
Market price generated by
intersection of supply and demand
schedules.PMKT
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Demand vs. Capacity
Use notions of consumers’ and producers’ surplus as
approximations of gains to trade, and measure of the
“welfare” accruing to parties.
Each diagram is a “snapshot” of the situation in the market
over a (say) 1-hour period.
In each hour, one of three possible scenarios will describe
the relationship between demand and generating
capacity.
Welfare implications of each will differ.
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Scenario 1: Low Demand
Demand equals supply at output
below the level of installed capacity.
Price equals marginal generating
cost.
DEMAND
SCHEDULE
SUPPLY
SCHEDULE
PRICE
QUANTITY
PMKT
CONSUMERS’
SURPLUS
GENERATING
CAPACITY
PRODUCERS’
SURPLUS
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Scenario 2: “Brownout”
Demand has increased.
Price now exceeds marginal cost of
generation.
PRICE
QUANTITY
PMKT
CONSUMERS’
SURPLUS
GENERATING
CAPACITY
PRODUCERS’
SURPLUS
Price rise deters some flexible
industrial users who would have
been prepared to pay marginal
generating costs – “brownout” refers
to their voluntary curtailment of use.
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Scenario 3: Rolling Blackouts
Demand has increased further.
PRICE
QUANTITY
PMKT
GENERATING
CAPACITY
PRODUCERS’
SURPLUS
In addition to flexible industrial
users, now the demand of some
residential and inflexible industrial
consumers cannot be satisfied with
installed generating capacity.
These users are not exposed to
price changes, so rationing occurs
by rolling blackouts.
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Combining the Scenarios
What determines which of the scenarios will obtain for any
particular hour?
1. Amount of demand (residential and inflexible industrial)
Fluctuations: seasonal, daily, temperature
2. Level of installed generating capacity
Determined by investment decisions of generators
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Just what goal are generators pursuing?  This will depend
upon the structure of industry.  Consider two alternatives:
“Benevolent central planner” -  maximises the total of
producer and consumer surplus, less installation costs.
Profit-maximising generator - maximises its share of
producers’ surplus, less installation costs.
Capacity Choice
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Hourly demand data for Ireland in 2002 were used to
compile estimates for hourly demand in 2003.
An uplift was applied to reflect expected economic growth.
There were no recorded instances of blackouts arising from
excess demand  this demand data was taken correspond
to quantities demanded in Scenario 1 situation.
Simulation for Ireland
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Results – Central Planner
The model suggests that the socially optimal level of
generating capacity for Ireland is:
3980 MW
This level of capacity meets system demand during 99.6%
of hourly periods during the year.
Brownouts: 20 hours per year (0.23% of time)
Blackouts: 22 hours per year (0.25% of time)
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Results – Private Generators
For tractability, assume that each profit-maximising generator is
identical as to:
•Size
•Portfolio of generating plant
•Expectations as to demand fluctuations
Where n firms are present, each will also need to consider the
capacity decisions of the other, identical, (n-1) firms.
Under these assumptions, maximising each firm’s share of producers’
surplus yields the same result as maximising total producers’
surplus
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Results – Private Generators
Number of
firms
17%
6%
77%
1
1871
43%
6%
51%
2
2446
58%
7%
35%
4
2797
71%
10%
19%
10
3006
Generat ing
C a p a c i t y
(MW)
Scenarios
1: Low Demand
2: Brownouts
3: Blackouts
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Results – Private Generators
Number of
firms
71%
10%
19%
10
3006
Generat ing
C a p a c i t y
(MW)
Scenarios
1: Low Demand
2: Brownouts
3: Blackouts
As number of firms increases
beyond 10, average firm size falls
below minimum economic plant size.
This is effectively the maximum
capacity that decentralised market
would install
Compare this with the socially
optimal level of generating capacity:
3980 MW
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Observations (1)
Identical-firm restriction precludes consideration of
merchant plants.
Assumption of monolithic grid excludes possibility of
distributed generation.  Depends on tech changes,
economies of scale.
Different form of intermediation by supplier will change
result eg. why not expose consumers to all price changes?
Induced demand: dependence would not have developed
if blackouts were a possibility.
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Observations (2)
Despite these points, model serves useful purpose of
illuminating some points that are usually overlooked…
Capacity shortages will be good for generators, if they can
benefit from the associated price spikes.
Why should we therefore expect them to install enough
capacity to avoid such spikes?
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Observations (3)
Even with a legacy of over-investment, capacity can be
tightened through managed obsolescence and failure to
respond to organic demand growth…
… and the lights may indeed be allowed to go down!
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THE END
